

ADDRESS TO THE
LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
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BY

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICA

Foreign intelligence has a long tradition in America. One of our earliest national heroes, Nathan Hale, was an intelligence agent. Our first President, General Washington, was an assiduous director and user of intelligence. Intelligence has changed in recent years, however, and today its reality is different from its traditional meaning. In the common understanding, intelligence is still linked with secrecy and spying. But what I would like to talk about tonight is the way we in America have changed the scope of the word "intelligence," so that it has come to mean something different from that old-fashioned perception. These changes have stemmed from characteristics peculiar to America and from the nature of our society.

The first and most dramatic change in today's meaning of the word "intelligence" stems from the technological genius of Americans. We have applied to intelligence the talents of our inventors, of our engineers, and of our scientists. In the short space of eighteen years since the U-2 began its missions, we have revolutionized intelligence. In 1960 this country engaged in a great debate as to whether there was a missile gap between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Today the facts are so well established that such a debate is impossible. Then we had to try to deduce from bits of circumstantial evidence how many missiles the Soviets had; today we see and count them. We wondered then what new missiles the Soviets might be developing; today we follow their tests and determine from them the range, the size, and the effectiveness of such missiles.

This technical contribution to intelligence not only provides a better basis for decisions about the national security of the United States, it also enables us to negotiate agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Over the years such limitation treaties were always stopped by one essential feature: the United States needed

some assurance that the other party would abide by a treaty's restraints. Thus we came up with the "open skies" proposal and tried to negotiate on-site inspection procedures. The Soviet leaders rejected these because they believed such measures would permit foreigners an undue degree of access to their sovereign territory.

It was only after American intelligence developed the ability to monitor such agreements from afar, through technical means, that we on our side became sufficiently confident to begin the process of mutual arms limitation. In the text of the first SALT agreement, intelligence in fact was even admitted to polite diplomatic society under the name of "national technical means of verification."

Technology has revolutionized the intelligence business in many other ways beyond those I just described. They provide a precision to our knowledge of the world around us, which was inconceivable fifteen years ago. I might add that I give full credit to the many talents here in California which have contributed immensely to this effort.

The second major contribution America has made to intelligence stemmed in part from a bad American habit. This was our habit of disbanding our intelligence machinery at the end of every war, requiring us to reassemble one hastily at the beginning of a new war. Thus we abandoned intelligence in the period after World War I, when Secretary of State Stimson is alleged to have commented that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." We disbanded the Office of Strategic Services in October 1945, only to establish a new central intelligence apparatus to help meet the Cold War in 1947.

This habitual exercise provided something new in 1942. We were faced then with the urgent need to provide intelligence support to our governmental and military leadership about such disparate areas of the world as the North African littoral, the "hump" between China and India, and distant Pacific islands. General William Donovan, our first director of central intelligence, mobilized the talents of academia and industry to assemble every possible American source of information on these subjects.

This central pool of intellectual talent proved its worth and provided the base for the second major American contribution to the intelligence profession. While certainly the collection of information is vital to intelligence,

an equally vital contribution comes from the analysis, assessment, and estimating process. The analytic staff within the Central Intelligence Agency has access to all the raw information on foreign areas available to our Government, ranging from that which is completely public to the most secret products of our worldwide collection apparatus. It subjects this information to the intellectual talents and experience of its membership, which in scope and scholarship can rival those of our large universities. It then produces objective and reasoned assessments of developments around the world and projections of likely future trends.

Some of the work of this corps of experts has come to light through the revelation of the Pentagon Papers, in which the various national estimates on Vietnam were shown to have been independent, objective assessments of the likely future course of events there. This is not the time or place to debate American involvement in Vietnam and the many factors which influenced it; I mention these reports only to demonstrate what this assessment process can contribute: an independent and objective assessment of a foreign situation, unaffected by political commitments or departmental parochialism.

As has been reported in the press, I have made certain changes in the bureaucratic structure through which these assessments are produced, but the estimating process in its essentials remains as it was. I hope I have even reinforced it by my own insistence that honest differences among the experts must be fully reflected in our final output rather than concealed under useless generalizations.

America's success in this assessment process perhaps influenced the formation by the Soviets a few years ago of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. The Soviets apparently have recognized, as we did long ago, that it is as important to study and try to understand American society as it would be to spy on it. While some other nations also consider assessment a part of their intelligence process, I know of none which can match the investment we in America have made in research and analysis as an integral element of our intelligence mechanism. The product delivered to our policymakers has often demonstrated the value of this investment, and opened new perspectives for the concept of intelligence.

American intelligence presents another unique feature. It must operate within the tradition of an open society in America. But, as General Washington once noted, "upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises" of intelligence. These principles are not easily reconcilable, and we are breaking new ground in intelligence doctrine as we try to resolve the dilemma between them.

Part of our solution to this problem appears in the National Security Act of 1947, providing that CIA have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions, i.e., that it is restricted to foreign intelligence. This limitation is clearly recognized among our employees, although my predecessors and I have candidly admitted that CIA made mistakes with respect to the wig and other equipment and the psychological profile provided to the Watergate "plumbers." I am confident and have assured the Congress publicly that it will be respected in the future.

The 1947 Act recognized the other horn of our dilemma when it charged the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. It is this charge that led my predecessors and me to take such Constitutional steps as are possible to retain the essential secrets of intelligence. In this respect we have at least one common interest with the profession of journalism: we are both interested in the protection of our sources.

We are currently engaged in the courts in an effort to enforce the secrecy agreement that one of our ex-employees signed when he came to work with us. In it he acknowledged that he would be receiving sensitive information and agreed to hold it secret unless we released it. We are not objecting to most of a book he proposed to write, even including about half of the items that we initially identified as technically classified. We are struggling, however, to prevent the publication of the names of a number of foreigners, publicity which could do substantial injury to individuals who once put their confidence in us. Similarly, we hope to withhold the details of specific operations where exposure could prevent our receipt of further information of great value. In some cases, the publication of the fact of our knowledge of a situation can be of major assistance to another nation in deducing how we must have learned of it and shutting us off from it. I might add that we do not censor our ex-employees' opinions.

We have cleared several such books full of criticism, in which the authors have been careful not to reveal our sources or operations. The most serious aspect of this struggle is that if we cannot protect our sources and methods, friendly foreign officials and individuals will be less forthcoming with us in the future, when it could be of critical importance to our country. No serious intelligence professional has ever believed that General Washington's maxim could be replaced by a variation of the Wilsonian approach to covenants, or "open intelligence openly arrived at."

Another unique aspect of American intelligence is our relationship to the Congress. Some of my foreign counterparts around the world display considerable shock when they learn that I appeared in an open hearing before the television cameras as a part of my Senate confirmation. Many of them would never be subjected to detailed scrutiny by their Parliament, and their identities are frequently totally unknown. Some months ago, for example, two journalists were prosecuted in Sweden—hardly a closed society—for revealing the startling fact that their country had an intelligence service. In our country our intelligence authority stems from an act of Congress, it is subject to oversight by the Congress, and it depends upon funds appropriated annually by the Congress.

The Congress has provided for itself a way of resolving the dilemma between the need for secrecy in intelligence and the demands of our open society. Those Senators and Congressmen designated to exercise oversight of CIA or review its budgets are fully informed of our activities, inspect us at will, and are given detailed and specific answers to any questions they raise. Other individual Senators and Congressmen and other committees frequently receive the same intelligence assessments of the world situation as are provided to the Executive Branch, on a classified basis, but they are not provided the operational details of our intelligence activities. This arrangement was established by the Congress and is, of course, subject to change. My own position is that the method by which Congress exercises its oversight of intelligence activity is a matter for the Congress to decide.

As a related aspect of American intelligence in this open society, I might say something about our relations with the public and the press. We do not conduct a public relations program; we are not in the public informa-

tion business. But we do make as much information as possible available to the news media and to the public. Groups of our citizens, including high school students, have visited our facilities, where we try to respond to their questions about the nature of American intelligence.

Thus we in the intelligence profession are aware that ours must be an intelligence effort conducted on American principles and that it must be more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities of other nations. At the same time, we must respect the essential professional requirement embodied in the National Security Act to protect our intelligence sources and methods. We will consequently continue to arouse wonderment from some of our foreign associates as to our openness, and concern among some American citizens that we still must keep some information secret if we are to conduct an intelligence effort at all.

Technical intelligence, the intellectual process of assessment, and our exposure to our Constitutional authorities and the public are three major contributions America has made to the intelligence profession. I do not want to be accused, however, of concealing the fact that intelligence still requires clandestine activity. Our technical intelligence and our study and assessment of material openly available throughout the world have certainly revolutionized the intelligence profession in the past twenty years. But they have not removed the needs of our national policy-makers for information on the intentions of other powers. They have not removed the need to identify at an early stage research abroad into some new weapon which might threaten the safety of our nation, so that we do not become aware of a new and overpowering threat, especially from a nation not as open as ours, too late to negotiate about it or to protect ourselves.

The need for clandestine collection can perhaps be illustrated by comparing the task facing me with that facing Mr. Andropov, the head of the KGB in the Soviet Union. Mr. Andropov faces a veritable cornucopia of easily acquired information about America from published and public sources. Out of this, he must pick those facts which are significant and assemble them into an accurate assessment of America. My task is to search for individual facts kept in the utmost secrecy in closed societies, and with these few facts try to construct whole assessments, in somewhat the way one extrapolates a reproduction of the skeleton of a *Brontosaurus*

from a thigh bone. Without the contributions of clandestinely acquired information, our *Brontosaurus* could in some situations be very deformed indeed.

Simple prudence, of course, causes us to use clandestine collection only when the information is available in no other way and is of real value to our country. My point is that such situations do exist. Thus we will continue to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to undertake clandestine intelligence missions. I might add only that we must do a better job of training future generations of American intelligence officers and agents than Nathan Hale received in a one-day briefing and the advice to place his reports in his shoes.

From this description we see that intelligence in today's complicated world is a complex affair. It must warn our Government of new generations of intercontinental missiles being developed, it must be attentive to foreign economic threats to America's strength and well-being, and it must identify political problems around the world which can adversely affect our interests. The very complexity of the challenge has led to the active collaboration of all the different elements of the American Government which can contribute to the process of information collection and national assessment. President Nixon has charged my predecessors and me with the leadership of this Intelligence Community and has provided certain interdepartmental mechanisms through which to implement this charge. This charge of leadership for the entire American intelligence process applies to the substance of our intelligence needs and to the resources devoted to intelligence. It puts on me the responsibility of preventing separate bureaucratic interests from impinging on the effectiveness or raising the cost of our national intelligence effort.

This then is foreign intelligence in and for America today. It reflects the technical and intellectual talents of America, it reflects our open society, it reflects the courage and integrity of our professional intelligence officers. Most important of all, it provides American policy-makers with critical information and reasoned assessments about the complex foreign political, economic, and military challenges to our national security and welfare. It is designed to help us to achieve and to live in peace, rather than only to protect us in time of war. It has become an important and permanent ele-

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ment of our national foreign policy structure. We Americans who are a part of it are proud of it, and of the improvements we Americans have brought to a profession which can be traced at least to Moses, who sent a man from each tribe to "spy out" the land of Canaan.

Thank you very much.

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